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Abstract 
This interdisciplinary co-authored Analysis piece introduces identity and 
integrity, which are argued to sit at the core of the person. It analyses 
approaches taken to these concepts by legal regimes, particularly in the 
context of individuals using artificial limbs or digital avatars. The piece 
concludes that law engages with identity and integrity to a limited and 
incomplete extent; and that law is thus inadequate in its engagement with 
the person, and its meaning making in this respect. This piece draws on 
two interdisciplinary funded projects, funded by the Wellcome Trust and 
the Arts and Humanities Research Council.       
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1 Introduction 
Law is one of the avenues by which we make meaning. It is, of course, a special 
avenue – or social institution – insofar as it contains strong purposive and 
coercive components. Law can facilitate or prohibit activities, and provide 
enforcement pathways for those facilitations and prohibitions. In so doing, law 
makes (and signals, though not always explicitly) value judgements about the 
utility and/or virtue of things, and of course, of ways of being. Law exposes, and 
helps remake, and sometimes embeds or ossifies social norms. In short, the law, 
through its expressiveness (i.e. through the oral and textual expressions that it 
makes via treaties, legislation, court decisions, and practices), is a core shaper of 
social expectations and behaviours.1 In addition to law, there are other avenues 
by which we give meaning to goods, to actions, to institutions, and to individuals, 
and by which we revise that meaning, and so by which we understand our 
reality.2 
Against this backdrop, in this Analysis we offer a non-exhaustive survey 
of two concepts that are key to the development of the person, namely ‘identity’ 
and ‘integrity’. We explore how the law approaches or understands them, 
particularly regarding their impact on those with physical disabilities. We draw 
                                                 
1  Shawn Harmon, “Katri Lohmus, Caring Autonomy: European Human Rights Law and the 
Challenge of Individualism” (2017) 25 Medical Law Review 1-9.  For a study of the expressive 
function of legislation, see Patricia Funk, “Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An 
Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines” (2007) 9 American Law and Economics 
Review 135-159.  For observations on the importance of the expressive functions of courts, see 
Bora Laskin, “The Role and Functions of Final Appellate Courts: The Supreme Court of 
Canada” (1975) 53 Canadian Bar Review 469; William Rehnquist, “The Changing Role of the 
Supreme Court” (1986) 14 Florida State University Law Review 1; Aharon Barak, “A Judge on 
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy” (2002-2003) 119 Harvard Law Review 
19; Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, “Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New 
Governance” (2006) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565-594; Neil Siegel “The Virtue of 
Judicial Statesmanship” (2007) 86 Texas Law Review 958-1032. 
2  Steven Krauss, “Research Paradigms and Meaning Making: A Primer” (2005) 10(4) The 
Qualitative Report 758-770. 
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heavily on our research in the disability setting, specifically involving disabled 
dance artists in the Arts and Humanities Research Council funded “InVisible 
Difference Project”3 (which has roots deep in the history of SCRIPTed),4 and users 
of prosthetics limbs and gamers with digital avatars in the Wellcome Trust-
funded “Identity and Governance of Bodily Extensions Project” (IGBE).5 These 
projects are both interdisciplinary, with empirical elements. InVisible Difference 
explored the relationship between dance, disability, and law and the need for 
legal, policy, and practical change; and IGBE explores the concept of extensions 
of self (both through artificial limbs and through digital avatars), with team 
members from law, performance, medicine, psychology, and sociology.   
Our modest intent in this Analysis is to uncover the extent to which (some) 
laws are sensitive to the identity and integrity of persons, particularly those who 
use prosthetic limbs. First, we unpack the notions of identity and integrity as 
central to “meaning-making”, both generally and in the disability context. 6 
Equipped with the lens that these concepts provide, we then locate them in the 
broader legal landscape, offering an overview of the extent to which they are 
noticed, and how they are understood. This will also allow us to draw some 
                                                 
3  See Project website http://www.invisibledifference.org.uk/ (accessed 12 November 2017), 
which sought to extend thinking around the making, status, ownership and value of work by 
contemporary dance choreographers, focusing specifically on that made and performed by 
disabled dance artists. 
4  See Abbe Brown, Shawn Harmon and Charlotte Waelde, “SCRIPT: A Legacy of Vitality” 
(2015) 12(1) SCRIPTed 51-58, available at https://script-ed.org/?p=1935 (accessed 12 
November 2017). 
5  See Project website http://www.pci.leeds.ac.uk/research/featured-research-
projects/identity-and-governance-of-bodily-extensions-the-case-of-prosthetics-and-avatars/ 
(accessed 12 November 2017); Sita Popat, Sarah Whatley et al., “Bodily Extensions and 
Performance” (2017) 13(2) International Journal of Performance Arts and Digital Media 101-104; 
and Shawn Harmon et al., “Bodily Extension and the Law: Medical Devices, Intellectual 
Property, Prosthetics and Marginalisation (Again)” (manuscript in preparation).           
6  There may well be other concepts of significance to prosthetic-users, but our research 
highlights these as particularly important, and they potentially have some resonance with the 
frameworks we are exploring. 
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preliminary conclusions about the extent to which the law empowers persons – 
and specifically prosthetic users – to act and participate in society. 
2 Identity and Integrity: an introduction 
In our previous interdisciplinary research,7 we explored the extent to which lived 
experiences of a person are intertwined with something which might be 
considered distinct from the person (e.g. a person controlling a digital avatar 
through a graphics tablet and experiences the avatar as being an extension of 
their own body); the links between a person’s dignity and their belonging to a 
wider community (such as that of disabled dance); and the need for a new 
approach to theorising dance made and performed by disabled dance artists.  We 
concluded that the concepts of identity and physical integrity can be key to 
meaning-making in these contexts, and more generally so regarding respect for 
the person.   
This also draws on other scholarship relating to identity and its 
importance to the person. Identity is a contested and multifaceted concept, and 
it has subjective and objective elements.8 Subjectively, “identity” can describe a 
variety of elements such as core personal values and self-perceptions, and 
objectively it can cover public statuses assigned at birth or later, and also how we 
might be described by others. Identities, then, can be internal and fluid, and also 
external and more permanent.9 These factors can apply to all persons; however, 
                                                 
7  Charlotte Waelde et al., “A New Foundation: Physical Integrity, Disabled Dance and Cultural 
Heritage” in Sarah Whatley et al. (eds.), InVisible Difference: Dance, Disability and Law (Bristol: 
Intellect, 2017 forthcoming); Sita Popat and Scott Palmer, “Embodied Interfaces: Dancing with 
Digital Sprites” (2008) 19(2) Digital Creativity 125-137. 
8  Augusto Blasi and Kimberly Glodis, “The Development of Identity: A Critical Analysis from 
the Perspective of the Self as Subject” (1995) 15 Developmental Review 404-433. 
9  Scott Lasch and Jonathan Friedman (eds.), Modernity and Identity (Basel: Blackwell, 1992); 
Donald Polkinghorne, “Explorations of Narrative Identity” (1996) 7 Psychological Inquiry 
363-367; Leonie Huddy, “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social 
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they are of particular relevance to prosthetic limb users. Empirical research 
carried out in the IGBE project and explored in more detail in another output 
(which also explored identity and integrity in more depth) found that the 
identities of prosthetic limb users are often deeply entangled with the external 
device or body extension that is the prosthetic.10   
A different connection exists between the prosthetic limb user and 
integrity. Scholarship shows “integrity” to have a moral focus, drawing on 
completeness; it also has links with different forms of insult or causing offence.11 
Integrity is relevant here as prosthetic limb users’ physical integrity is often seen 
as lacking or having been undermined by their condition (here the absence or 
one or more limbs), and there is a perceived lack of wholeness.12  Conversely, 
however, there is a rich body of work arguing that physical integrity need not 
involve a so-called “normal” body; if one is born, say, with one hand, then having 
a body with one-hand is normal and the body has integrity – the body is, 
however, non-normative.13  
                                                 
Identity Theory” (2001) 22 Political Psychology 127-156. For the construction of identity in 
specific settings, see for example Ingegard Fagerberg and Mona Kihlgren, “Experiencing a 
Nurse Identity: The Meaning of Identity to Swedish Registered Nurses 2 Years After 
Graduation” (2001) 34 Journal of Advanced Nursing 137-145; Elisa Abes and David Kasch, 
“Using Queer Theory to Explore Lesbian College Students' Multiple Dimensions of Identity” 
(2007) 48 Journal of College Student Development 619-636; Jesse Smith, “Becoming an Atheist in 
America: Constructing Identity and Meaning from the Rejection of Theism” (2011) 72 Sociology 
of Religion 215-237. 
10  Harmon et al. (manuscript in preparation), supra n. 5. 
11  Axel Honneth, “Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality on the Theory 
of Recognition” (1992) 20 Political Theory 187-201; Roberta Galler, “The Myth of the Perfect 
Body” in Carole Vance (ed.) Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) 165-172; Charlotte Waelde et al., “A New Foundation”, supra 
n. 7. 
12  Tomoko Tamari, “Body Image and Prosthetic Aesthetics. Disability, Technology and 
Paralympic Culture” (2017) 23(2) Body & Society 25-56;  Shawn Harmon,  Kate Marsh, Sarah 
Whatley and Karen Wood, “Moving toward a new aesthetic” in Sarah Whatley et al. (eds.), 
InVisible Difference, supra n. 7. 
13  Galler, supra n. 11; Sharon Betcher, “Putting my Foot (Prosthesis, Crutches, Phantom) Down: 
Considering Technology as Transcendence in the Writings of Donna Harraway” (2001) 29 
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Strong arguments exist, then, for identity and integrity to exist as concepts, 
and for them to be particularly relevant (in potentially conflicting ways) to the 
development and personhood of prosthetic limb users. From this theoretical and 
empirical base, we focus in this piece on some instances of how law engages (or 
does not engage) with these concepts.   
3 Identity and Integrity: and the Law 
3.1 Identity 
First, we acknowledge that the concept of “identity” is known to the law, but 
law’s interaction with the concept is often either indirect or non-explicit, or both. 
For example, the law acknowledges and shapes a range of phenomena that are 
pertinent to identity; it both confers and places restrictions on the rights available 
to certain groups based on identity-relevant factors such as developmental status 
(i.e. the right of foetuses to legal standing and protection);14 sexual orientation 
(i.e. the right to marry,15 the right to work benefits);16 and gender (i.e. the right to 
be recognised as the sex/gender with whom they most identify). 17  Rather 
unexplored notions of identity have also been explicitly referenced by courts to 
inform ethical and legal arguments relating to kinship and new technologies such 
as in vitro fertilisation technologies. An example is Rose and another v Secretary of 
                                                 
Women’s Studies Quarterly 35-53. 
14  Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 12. For more examples, see Aurora Plomer, “A Foetal Right to 
Life? The Case of Vo v France” (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 311-338. 
15   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (hereafter ‘ICCPR’), art 23(2); 
Ignacio Saiz, “Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation: A Decade of 
Development and Denial at the UN” (2004) 7 Health and Human Rights 48-80. 
16   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) hereafter ‘ICESCR’, 
arts 6(1), 7.  
17   On basis European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Rights (1951) (hereafter 
‘ECHR’), art 8 right to private life, see also Goodwin v United Kingdom (28957/95) [2002] 
I.R.L.R. 664.  
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State for Health,18 in the context of an application for judicial review (regarding 
disclosure of information about artificial insemination under a legislative regime 
which did not provide for this). The court found that information about 
biological identity went to the heart of identity and to the make-up of the person; 
and that identity included details of origins and opportunity to understand them, 
physical and social identity, and also psychological integrity. 
Identity is also explicitly referenced or unavoidably implicated in a range 
of legal instruments. Most notable is the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which erects rights in respect of private life (which was discussed in 
Rose), religion, and expression.19 From a disability perspective, the International 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (CRPD) provides for 
respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve their identities,20 and 
General Comments21 in respect of it explore layers of identity in the context of 
discrimination22 and linguistic identity in the context of the deaf.23  
                                                 
18  Rose and another v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin). 
19  Although note that each have their own limits. For more on rights and identity, see Jill 
Marshall, Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Jill Marshall, Human Rights Law 
and Personal Identity (London: Routledge, 2014); Romina Sijniensky and N Alexander 
Aizenstatd, “Towards a Uniform Basis for the Right to Identity in the Normative Framework 
of the American Convention on Human Rights” (2014) 7 Inter-American and European Human 
rights Journal 75-92, in the context of disappearing children. 
20  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (hereafter ‘CRPD’), art 3(h).   
21  See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities General Comments webpage, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/GC.aspx (accessed 12 November 2017). 
22  CRPD General Comment No. 3 considering intersectional discrimination, building on layers 
of identities, and Daniela Ikawa, “The Construction of Identity and Rights: Race and Gender 
in Brazil” (2014) 10 International Journal of Law in Context 494-506. 
23  CRPD General Comment No. 4 regarding inclusive education, arts 9, 34 (b), 56. See also draft 
CRPD General Comment No. 6 (April 2017) on CRPD, art 5 right of persons with disabilities 
to equality and non-discrimination, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CallPersonsDisabilitiesEqualityResponsa
bility.aspx (accessed 12 November 2017) paras 10 and 11.  
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A review of legal instruments and usage, however, also demonstrates that 
identity is not understood uniformly. For example, the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989) states that the child shall be registered immediately 
after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, to acquire a nationality, 
and to know and be cared for by their parents.24 Further, the parties undertake to 
respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, 
name, and family relations without unlawful interference and also that, where a 
child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, 
parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-
establishing speedily his or her identity.25 Here, identity is associated with social 
connections (familial and community) insofar as they link to wellbeing, benefits, 
and traceability.   
By contrast, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) 
states that parties shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings, and 
guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other 
rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and 
medicine.26 Here, identity is linked to dignity and the capacity to hold interests 
and rights that create space to make personal decisions, and so is closely 
associated with autonomy. Finally, the UNESCO International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data (2003) explicitly recognises the special nature of genetic 
data to individual and group identity, and emphasises it as a critical factor in 
meaning-making. It goes on to provide, however, that a person’s identity should 
not be reduced to genetic characteristics (because it involves complex 
                                                 
24  UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (hereafter ‘CRC’) art 7(1). 
25  CRC, art 8. 
26  Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (1997), art 1. 
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educational, environmental and personal factors and emotional, social, spiritual 
and cultural bonds with others and implies a dimension of freedom).27 So again, 
identity as characterised by genetic characteristics and kinship is recognised as 
important. In contrast, the work of the UN Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (an appointment with, broadly, a mandate to lead and stimulate 
discussion and make recommendations regarding implementation)28 makes no 
reference to identity. Interestingly, however, the Rapporteur does focus on 
participation, inclusiveness, embracing diversity and change in social 
perceptions all points which can be argued to be relevant to identity.29  
Law also provides opportunities for claims to be raised in respect of 
image, publicity, or personality rights, notably in respect of inaccurate claims of 
product endorsement and merchandising. 30  The legal constructions for these 
rights are complex, drawing on the doctrine of passing off and Roman-Dutch 
principles of iniuriam – which builds in turn on Grotius’ claim that a man’s life is 
his own by nature, not indeed to destroy, but to preserve it, and so is his body, 
his limbs, his reputation, his honour, and his actions.31 This strand is another 
means of protecting identity. It requires, however, that necessary thresholds are 
met, notably that there is some form of reputation or goodwill (distinct from 
                                                 
27  UNESCO International Declaration on Biological Human Data (2003), recital 6, art 3, 4. 
28  Appointed 2014, see UN Human Rights Officer of the High Commissioner Webpage  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disability/SRDisabilities/Pages/SRDisabilitiesIndex.aspx 
(accessed 12 November 2017). 
29  UN General Assembly. Human Rights Council. 28th session. A/HRC/28/58. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Pages/ListReports.asp
x (accessed 12 November 2017), paras 4, 19(a) (b) (c), 33(c).   
30  Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd [1991] FSR 145; Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] 
EWHC 367 (Ch.); Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a Topshop) [2015] EWCA Civ 3; OBG Ltd 
v Allan [2007] UKHL 21. 
31  H Grotius (transl. A Campbell), De juri belli ac pacis Lib. II, Cap. XVII, II (NY: M Walter Dunne, 
1901).  
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ownership but arguably analogous here), and then some activity and risk of 
damage.32 
3.2 Integrity 
Integrity is also encompassed by a range of human rights found in regional and 
international instruments. For example, the ECHR right to respect for private and 
family life discussed above has been held to “encompass moral and physical 
integrity and to extend to situations of deprivation of liberty”.33 There are also 
references to integrity in the CRPD and this is developed in General Comments.34 
The CRPD provides that “[e]very person with disabilities has a right to respect 
for his or her physical and mental integrity”.35 Further, the CRPD provides that 
states are to take all steps to protect persons with disabilities from all forms of 
exploitation.36 Finally, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
(2006) provides that in advancing science and technology, there is to be respect 
for the personal integrity of people with special vulnerability.37   
                                                 
32  See generally Gillian Black, Publicity Rights and Image: Exploitation and Legal control (Oxford: 
Hart, 2011); Elspeth Christie Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (W Green, 
2010), 5-14; Grutter v Lombard (628/05) [2007] ZASCA 2. South Africa has used the question of 
identity in passing off and image personality type cases (ibid., paras 7 – 13); this is the converse 
of a developing debate in the law of passing off regarding how can brand owners protect their 
goodwill (for well-known celebrities arguably their identity) when it is being used beyond 
particular sets of goods. Here, the focus of actual self being extended, rather than its power 
being extended. See Catherine Ng, “The Law of Passing Off – Goodwill Beyond Goods” (2016) 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 817-842.  
33  Husayn v Poland (2015) 60 EHRR 16 (ECtHR). See also Dickson v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 41 (Grand 
Chamber). 
34  References are made to integrity in draft CRPD General Comment No. 6 paras 5, 8, supra n. 
23. 
35  CRPD, art 17 also considered in CRPD General Comment No. 1 (regarding CRPD art 12 right 
to equal recognition before the law) paras 29, 31, 42.    
36  CRPD, art 16(1). 
37  Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2006), art 8. 
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At the national level and moving away from physical disability, integrity 
also informs the rights of those who lack capacity (i.e. who cannot exercise 
autonomy) to be protected, and to have decisions taken on their behalf only in 
support of their best interests. For example, the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which 
applies to England and Wales, articulates the key theme of “best interests” (i.e. 
decision-makers must take decisions on someone’s behalf that are in that 
person’s best interest as understood from the perspective of that person). The 
legislation also has a theme of “least restrictive means” (i.e. where a decision is 
taken that interferes with the person’s physical integrity, the option that 
represents the least restrictive means must be adopted – it must impose on them 
in a limited way and the idea of proportionality is important).38 When applying 
these tests (outside the prosthetic context), courts have seen physical integrity as 
important. 39  
4 A different perspective: disability 
4.1 Law and disability 
We can see, then, that the law does engage both directly and indirectly with the 
concepts of identity and integrity, which are so important to meaning-making, 
and so to personal narrative and worldview. However, we have seen that the 
law’s reliance on them is not equal, nor is the law’s understanding of them 
consistent. Further, the position of these concepts in specific legal regimes 
discussed (including those relating to disability) does not reflect the importance 
                                                 
38  Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1. 
39  See A Local Authority v K [2013] EWCOP 242 (Fam) regarding a person with learning 
disabilities and sterilisation as opposed to a coil para 26; Aintree University Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust v James [2013] 3 WLR 1299 (SC) paras 19 et seq regarding withdrawal of 
treatment; and Mental Health Trust and others v DD [2015] EWCOP 4 (Fam) also on 
contraception and sterilisation paras 5, 84. 
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accorded to these concepts by prosthetic users as indicated by our empirical 
research and the scholarly arguments discussed above. In fact, when it comes to 
prosthetic users (and disabled persons more generally), the law engages more 
readily with the concept of disability. In so doing, however, it will be suggested 
that an overly narrow and problematic approach has been taken, which does not 
engage with the importance of the person.   
 International human rights instruments provides that everyone is entitled 
to dignity,40 and to certain economic, social and cultural rights which are viewed 
as indispensable to the achievement of dignity and the free development of 
personality. 41  However, the focus of service-provision and rights-protection 
under these instruments has, in the main, been on ensuring survival, access, and 
participation. 42  We have not seen a celebration of diversity, facilitating 
achievement of excellence (which has been achieved by people with disabilities 
in areas such as in sport, 43  dance, 44  or comedy 45 ), or seeking to enable true 
flourishing.46 Possible goals in this respect might be the requirement for elite 
funding across these areas47 and the inclusion of this in international reports. This 
                                                 
40   Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter ‘UDHR’) (1948), art 1. 
41  See UDHR, art 22. There are also treaty references to culture, freedom of expression, and 
creative achievement: ICESCSR, art 15(1)(a) and (c);  ICCPR, art 19; CRPD, arts 21 and 30. 
42  See UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 5 (1994) 
paras 37-9 and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 
No. 21 (2009) para 30. 
43  E.g. Paralympics at Rio 2016, available at https://www.paralympic.org/rio-2016 (accessed 12 
November 2017), notably the achievements of Jonnie Peacock and Emma Wiggs.  
44  E.g. Caroline Bowditch, available at http://www.carolinebowditch.com and Claire 
Cunningham http://www.clairecunningham.co.uk, (both accessed 12 November 2017). 
45  E.g. The Last Leg, available at http://www.channel4.com/programmes/the-last-leg (accessed 
12 November 2017). 
46  Marshall, Personal Freedom, supra n. 19, pp 25, 26 considering Conor Gearty Can Human Rights 
Survive? (Cambridge:  CUP, 2006) in particular pp 49, 50, 58, 141. 
47   E.g. building on UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 
No. 21 (2009) para 52 (d) regarding financial assistance, although this does not refer to 
disability. 
(2017) 14:2 SCRIPTed 326  339 
wider approach would be more consistent with a focus on the person and on 
engaging with identity and integrity.  
This would also have an impact at the domestic level. So far, the UK 
Equality and Human Rights Commission 48  and the Scottish Human Rights 
Commission49 tend to focus on food, housing, and basic employment. Their 2017 
reports to the Committee of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities emphasise (appropriately) dignity and autonomy, but then focus on 
identifying barriers to good standards of independent living, safety and 
accessibility, health, and life. 50  The reports do not take the opportunity to 
construct body diversity as “normal” and as having a central place in the 
mainstream. 51 They do not engage robustly with true equality and social justice 
for the individual person and the body/identity link – in essence, looking beyond 
functionality to an approach more integrated with creative and cultural 
expression and achievement and wider growth, reflecting developments seen in 
the avatar context.52  The national position is also disappointing as the CRPD in 
                                                 
48  Equality and Human Rights Commission, available at 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en (accessed 12 November 2017). 
49  Scottish Human Rights Commission, available at http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/ 
(accessed 12 November 2017). 
50  UKEHRC, Disability Rights in the UK:  UK Independent Mechanism Submission to Inform the 
CRPD - List of Issues on the UK (2017)   
http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/media/1559/crpdfeb2017ukimuksubmission.pdf (last 
accessed 12 September 2017); UKEHRC, Disability Rights in Scotland: Supplementary 
Submission to Inform the CRPD - List of Issues on the UK (2017), at 
http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/media/1558/crpdfeb2017scotlandsupplement.pdf (last 
accessed 12 September 2017). 
51  For a wider discussion of disability and law, see Aileen McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and 
the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2014). 
52  Given this narrow focus, it also interesting to note that debates have recently commenced 
around the creation of new rights to encompass the digital world and to better reflect our 
position(s) within it. See claims to rights of access to the internet (Labour digital manifesto, 
available at http://www.jeremyforlabour.com/digital_democracy_manifesto, and Nicola 
Lucchi, The Impact of Science and Technology on the Rights of the Individual (New York: Springer, 
2016), pp. 31-96) and, in the light of the discussions above regarding digital avatars, note Jack 
Balkin and Beth Noveck (eds.), The State of Play: Law, Games and Virtual Worlds (New York: 
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its engagement with culture and sport refers to access, and to people with 
disabilities being able to fulfil their creative, artistic, and intellectual potential for 
their own benefit and also that of society.53 Accordingly, from this base, there 
remains the need for a strong call for true equality.54 
4.2 Reflections 
The narrow emphasis taken in the main to delivery of human rights at the 
international and national level may, arguably, be a natural consequence of the 
origins of human rights law (as a response to misdeeds perpetrated in World War 
II). It may also reflect widespread views on the appropriate limits of human 
rights (as tools for ensuring “freedom from” various activities by the state rather 
than anything more positive requiring substantial action or investment on the 
part of the state or others).55   
The approach is also, arguably, a consequence of the “medical” model of 
disability that the law and powerful social actors (like the medical profession) 
                                                 
NYU Press, 2006), and Ralph Koster “A Declaration of the Rights of Avatars”, available at 
http://www.raphkoster.com/games/essays/declaring-the-rights-of-players/ (accessed 12 
November 2017). 
53   CRPD, arts 30(1), (2), (5). 
54  For wider consideration of this, engagement with dance and the possible place of NGOs in 
CRPD monitoring, see Catherine Easton, “An Analysis of Reporting and Monitoring in 
Relation to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the 
Right to Participation in Cultural Life and intellectual property” in Sarah Whatley et al. 
(eds.), InVisible Difference, supra n. 7.    
55  As such, economic and cultural rights were long seen as aspirational rather than enforceable. 
See Katherine Young, “The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in 
Search of Content” (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 113-17; Tamara Hervey and Jeff 
Kenner (eds.), Economic and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal 
Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2003). However, such a narrow approach to human rights is 
increasingly questioned. See Jerome Bickenbach et al., “Models of Disablement, Universalism 
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have long held to and pursued. This sees disability as a problem to be cured.56  
More recently, the “social” model of disability can be seen in the law. This model 
adopts the position that disability arises from social structures and 
environmental barriers.57 The Equality Act 2010, which is the UK’s response to 
the CRPD, 58  contains hints of the social model with a focus on protected 
characteristics, which include disability. 59 The legislation focuses on activities 
which a person may be able to do, or may be being prevented from doing because 
of their condition (again from the upright bipedal perspective); and the 
legislation imposes on the providers of services and also the public sector more 
generally (but not more widely) the obligation to make reasonable adjustments 
to practices and physical spaces to accommodate individuals with these 
characteristics – considering in detail employment, education, and property. 60   
The social model also underlies the Scottish Government’s 2016 “A Fairer 
Strategy for Disabled People”, which was built on strong engagement with 
disabled people. 61  Yet the social model, in turn, has been challenged by the 
“affirmative” model. This model focuses on what people can do rather than on 
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World (Leeds: The Disability Press, 2005).  
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what they cannot do.62 And it is this mode which would enable greater (indirect) 
delivery of identity and integrity and regard to the person, through requiring, 
say, equality of funding and equality of programming of events and through 
which wider society could be transformed through inclusion.    
5 Delivery 
Finally, quite apart from substantive challenges to law’s engagement with 
integrity and identity, it should be noted that the ability to bring an action to 
pursue identity and integrity can be limited. One needs a claim that fits into a 
specific framework, such as a claim for privacy with the necessary requirements 
being met,63 a claim for paternity recognition,64 a demand for a particular activity 
to be prevented,65 or an application for judicial review as seen. The existence of 
national human rights legislation – such as the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 – 
does not mean that the human rights discussed above are direct or easily accessed 
pathways to national courts.66 Further, the Equality Act 2010 does not impose 
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in French. 
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obligations on all.  
To address this, there should be an imposition of equality obligations on 
all at the national level; a right to pursue these obligations directly at court; and 
a clearer international requirement for countries to invest in and report on how 
they are supporting an affirmative approach to diversity (rather than merely 
enabling physical access and basic mobility). The first two would be a significant 
change given the place of human rights and treaties in the UK, and the third is 
inconsistent with the present international framework. All three are, however, 
consistent with the 2017 CRPD draft General Comment regarding equality and 
non-discrimination.67 And the proposals are necessary to enable law to provide 
an appropriate place for integrity, identity, and the person.   
6 Conclusion 
Identity and integrity have been identified by empirical and conceptual work as 
being at the core of the person. This analysis reveals, however, that they are not 
accorded such importance by the law. There are various legal tools by which one 
might seek to pursue or defend identity or integrity. The focus of the legal action, 
however, will not come under those terms; the relevant laws and pathways 
operate without a focus on the person. Law is failing, then, in its meaning making 
to address the person – indeed, the person is peripheral. This was a disappointing 
message for the lawyers to report to interdisciplinary colleagues; and in our 
ongoing work building on the InVisible Difference and IGBE projects, we argue 
for change in this respect. Three rather radical proposals have been made here as 
to how law can be adapted. This would create wider obligations to address 
inequality, more focus on existing human rights which address the whole of the 
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person, and also on the person’s opportunities to engage across society. This 
would go some way to creating a new reality for, and meaning in respect of, the 
person. Law might not be willing to accommodate such radical proposals that 
run to the heart of disability and human rights legislation. If so, law will continue 
to fail in its meaning-making.  
